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The purpose of this study is to provide an interpretation of the power penetration delivered through 
the United States’ overseas military bases. This study specifically concentrates on the military bases in 
Guam. 
The penetration of U.S. power into the Guam economy delivers three results. First of all, military 
bases boost the island’s economy. Secondly, the bases bring economic structural change to Guam. 
Such change is shown through the average hourly wages among industries. Lastly, as the military 
bases increase in size, the functions of foreign companies enlarge as well. The increase of foreign 
companies can be traced back to the enlargement of military contracts awarded by the Department of 
Defense. Along with the economic influence, the military base in Guam is interpreted to influence the 
island’s identity indication. 
In this study, U.S. military bases in Guam have been explained as a method of United States’ power 
implementation into the economic sphere and the island’s identity. In sum, the military bases affect the 
economic growth, economic structure, and the generation gap towards identity indication. 
 





The purpose of the present study is to provide an interpretation of power penetration put 
forth by United States’ overseas military bases. In particular, this study focuses on the 
military bases in Guam by analyzing the Guamanian economy and identity. Rather than 
interpreting the military bases in Guam from a security-oriented perspective, the present 
study explains the influence of U.S. base expansion from economic and cultural standpoints. 
This paper does not consider the cultural and economic impact to be equally important as the 
security function of military bases. However, it does point out that these areas are also 
important elements in explaining the effects of military bases.    
The end of the Spanish-American War and the Treaty of Paris in 1898 granted the United 
States an island called Guam as an unincorporated and unorganized territory. Meanwhile, the 
Organic Act1 in 1950 approved Guam with limited self-governing authority, making it an 
organized yet unincorporated territory. ‘Unincorporated territory’ means being under the 
United States with limited control. With this background, the military bases that take up 
about 30 percent of the island can be understood as another means of U.S. power penetration. 
In light of “the power delivering”2 function of military bases, this study shows that the 
                                                          
1 U.S. Federal Law 48 U.S.C. § 1421: “the territory ceded to the United States in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December 10, 
1898, and proclaimed April 11, 1899, and known as the island of Guam in the Marianas Islands, shall 
continue to be known as Guam.”  
2 Here the power delivering function is drawn out throughout this paper via the word ‘penetration.’  
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expansion of U.S. bases have economic and social impacts on host territories.  
At this point, one may wonder why the economy and identity of a small island in the 
Pacific matters to the United States. The importance of the Guam case is that it is the key 
military base for the United States’ power establishment in the Asian Pacific region. With the 
movement of 8,000 marines from the Okinawa base, the significance of Guam is highlighted. 
Although there is a risk to defining Guam as a foreign base due to its political status, Guam 
represents a location that can be understood as both a U.S. inland base while being an 
overseas base. With this particular trait, studying the Guam military base is important for its 
dual representation. Therefore, along with this dual representation and the present situation 
of military bases increasing, the military base increase in Guam contains significant 
importance as a case study. With the Guam case, we shed light on rather veiled effects of 
military bases: the economic and cultural impacts imposed on the host territory.  
The U.S. overseas military bases influence the security, economy and culture of a 
territory; all three of which are important when observing the impact of a foreign military 
base. By looking at all three factors, the influence of military bases can be reevaluated.  
 
 
2. THE POLITICS OF U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY BASES AND BASES IN GUAM 
 
Prior to evaluating the influence of the military bases, let us first go through a brief 
overview of its history. The history of overseas military bases can be traced back to the days 
of the Roman Empire. Much later the British established off-island bases to sustain its power. 
As an island nation, there was a great need for Great Britain to control the surrounding seas 
and its colonies. Until the end of World War I, Pax Britannica had her days as the ruler of 
overseas bases. Likewise, throughout history, empires have proven their strength through 
widespread military forces. Since World War II, with the onset of the American Empire, one 
of the most important strategies used to display its military strength has been the 
solidification of its bases and troops. The United States has used overseas bases to control 
“operational staging areas and as tools for strategic deterrence” (Calder, 2007:7-33). For 
instance, the use of military bases as a tool for strategic deterrence can be identified during 
the Cold War.  
However, after the fall of the iron curtains, there was another need for the United States 
to sustain its size and location of the overseas basins. One of the main reasons for the U.S. 
overseas base locations after the Cold War can be traced to its ‘symbolic’ function. The 
‘symbolic’ function of overseas bases is also mentioned in the “National Security Strategy of 
the United States” delivered by President George Bush:  
 
“….The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. 
commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in 
defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that 
favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the 
United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, 
as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces” (Bush, 
2009). 
 
One of the most commonly used variable when sizing U.S. power is military strength. 
Through overseas bases, the United States is able to project its strength into other countries. 




With no other country in the world on par with this military giant, the U.S. is a clear leader in 
armed forces competition. This assurance of military strength is surely a direct means of 
proving the existence of the American Empire.  
According to the Departments of Defense’s 2009 Base Structure Report, the United 
States possesses “539,000 facilities (buildings, structures, and linear structures) located on 
more than 5,570 sites, on approximately 29 million acres (U.S. Department of Defense, 
2009).” Among the properties of the DoD military infrastructures, 121 are in U.S. territories 
while 716 are located in non-U.S. territorial states. As mentioned earlier, bases that are part 
of both U.S. and non-U.S. territories, such as Guam, are considered as overseas bases in this 
study. Other than visible military powers, displayed by the size of U.S. bases, the 
accessibility of military strength and the political influence which it delivers is considered 
when assessing the influence of overseas bases.  
The definition of ‘base politics’ used in this study is “the interaction between basing 
nations and host [territories3] on matters relating to the status and operation of local military 
facilities in the host [territories], together with related transnational interactions involving 
non state actors” (Calder, 2007:65). Keeping in mind the interactions between the basing 
nation (the United States) and the hosting territory (Guam), base politics in this study is 
focused on the politics of power penetrated into the hosting societies. The present study tries 
to explain the influence of the U.S. overseas basins toward the economy and identity of the 
host territories. Moreover, the word ‘penetration’ used throughout this paper suggests that 
there is indirect influence of U.S. power via its military bases. By setting the military bases4 
in Guam as a ‘power penetrating tool,’ this study examines the influence of the U.S. military 
bases in a host territory.   
In Guam, there are two bases, Naval Base Guam and Andersen Air Force Base, which 
means the U.S. Department of Defense owns 40,000 acres of land—approximately 29 
percent of the island (Joint Program Office Guam, 2010). Naval Base Guam is located in 
Apra Harbor. In 1994, Naval Station and Naval Magazine Guam were consolidated into 
Naval Activities, bringing forth a name change to Naval Base Guam in 2004. Naval Base 
Guam consists of four naval commands: Guam Naval Activities, the Naval Fleet and 
Industrial Supply Center, the Naval Ship Repair Facility, and their Naval Facilities 
Engineering Command called Marianas. Having numerous operating bodies, Naval Base 
Guam is an essential site in the Western Pacific (Naval Base Guam, n.d.). With the sea 
secured by Naval Base Guam, the airway of the Pacific is protected by the Andersen Air 
Force Base (AFB) located in Yigo, Guam. The host unit at Andersen is the 36th Wing (36 
WG), assigned to the Pacific Air Forces’ 13th Air Force. The 36 WG's mission is to provide 
support to deployed air and space forces to Andersen and to support tenant units assigned to 
the base (Andersen Air Force Base).  
For possessing both a naval base and an air force base, Guam is often referred to as the 
“tip of the spear” (Bevan, 2010) for its vital location in the Asia-Pacific region. For this 
reason, the strategic importance of the military position in Guam is being heightened. The 
basic reasoning behind is the value of this location and with the 9.11 terror crisis as a 
                                                          
3 Kent Calder uses the term “host nations” for his definition of base politics. However, since this study 
broadens the scope of hosting nations to also the territories own by the United States, the term is 
changed to “host territories.”  
4 In Guam, there are the Navy Bases and the Andersen Air Force Base. In this paper, the distinction 
among the navy and the air-force is not made and will look at the bases as the military base in general.  
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facilitator, the strategic importance of the Guam base is being evermore emphasized. Since 
2000, the U.S. military has initiated a buildup project in Guam. The purpose of this 
enlargement of military ability is to increase deterrence and power projection in response to 
potential crises and disasters, counter-terrorism, and contingencies related to Asian countries 
like South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Therefore, the main political reason 
behind the launch of military bases in Guam is to secure the political power of the United 
States in the Asian Pacific region.  
To increase regional power in the Pacific region during the past years, the size of the 
bases in Guam and investment towards them have increased as well. The following Tables 1-
1 and 1-2 show the increasing figures of military expenditures in Guam from fiscal year 1997 
to 2008.  
Table 1 shows the overall investment put into the military bases in Guam. The total 
spending over the years has increased. However, the pattern of specific expenditures differs 
in direction. As the military bases in Guam have increased in 2000, the military and civilian 
payments have decreased while spending on the military construction has increased. The gap 
is shown in Table 2 below. By subtracting the military-related payments (the sum of military 
and civilian payments) from the amount of military construction expenditure, the spending 
increased in military construction can be observed. 
When annually compared, the direction of changes is shown to have altered. From 1997 
to 2008, approximately 30 million dollars on average have increased in terms of military 
expenditures in Guam. However, the payment toward the military/civilian personnel has 
decreased. This means the number of soldiers has declined while businesses and workers 
related to the base construction have increased. The gap between the two expenditures has 
dramatically increased since 2000 due to the DoD’s announcement regarding the importance 
and size of the Guam bases. In addition, the construction increase in Guam can be linked to 
the inflow of foreign companies and foreign nationals.  
 
Table 1-1. Military Expenditures in Guam: Fiscal Years 1997 to 2008 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Expenditures 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total Spending 
  Military Pay 
  Civilian Pay 

























*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Consolidated Federal Funds Report- FY1997-FY2002  
 
Table 1-2. Military Expenditures in Guam: Fiscal Years 1997 to 2008 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Expenditures 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Spending 
 Military Pay 
 Civilian Pay 

























*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Consolidated Federal Funds Report- FY2003-FY2008 




Table 2. Expenditure Shift from Military Related Payment to Military Construction 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Year  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Expenditure Gap  -276.5 -158.6 -152.2 -8.6 -10 32.8 
Year  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Expenditure Gap  220.2 61.9 102.2 79.8 204.6 423.2 
*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Consolidated Federal Funds Report- FY1997-FY2008  
**Formula: Military Construction – (Military Pay + Civilian Pay) 
***Note: Calculation done by the author.  
 
Size increase should not be the only aspect in measuring the increase of a military base. 
Other than the external purpose of locating military bases in Guam, there are also ‘inner-
island’ reasons. For Guam, the existence of the U.S. military bases can be interpreted as a 
continuance of the colonial period. According to the Organic Act 1950, the still-existing U.S. 
lily pads deliver “colonial presence (Dalisay, 2008)”. According to a scholar who studies the 
Guamanian public opinion, regarding American presence, the Chamorro in Guam (Dalisay, 
2008) have their way of “making sense” of it. Concerning the research question of how, it 
turns out that the native islanders have an “ambivalent” (Dalisay, 2008) emotion. Through 
Dalisay’s interviews conducted on the island, it is clear that the military bases act as a 
resemblance of U.S. power. In Dalisay’s study, the relationship between the U.S. and Guam 
is explained in a metaphorical context of ‘master and servant.’ This illustrates that the 
military base in Guam is normally viewed as a symbol of Americanization and 
modernization (Perez, 2002; Perez, 2001; Perez, 2005; Kehoe, 1976). 
The existing academic studies on the relationship between the military base and the local 
society have been focused on the native indigenous population: the Chamorro. This study not 
only deals with the native population but also goes further. Military bases have been viewed 
as a medium for delivering military power. However, other than the intensification of 
military strength, the military bases in Guam also affect the economy and promote a greater 
awareness of the Guamanian identity.  
 
 
3. POWER PENETRATION OF U.S. MILITARY BASES INTO THE GUAMANIAN 
ECONOMY 
 
Due to the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and the U.S. military 
contradiction in 1999, the Guamanian economy was suffering. This indicates just how much 
Guam depended on U.S. military bases. Although the Asian Economic Crisis was an 
inevitable occurrence, the downsizing of the U.S. military presence was debatably an act that 
could be controlled.  
It is true that Guam’s military dependency has decreased over the years. U.S. federal 
support has helped promote Guam’s economic independence. In light with these efforts, the 
tourism industry has come into the spotlight. Although the military comprises of 30 percent 
of the island’s economy, this is, in fact, still the second largest component of Guam’s  
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Table 3. Core Components of Guam’s Economy 
*Source: Bureau of Statistics and Plans and Guam Economic Development and Commerce Authority, 
the Guam Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) 
 
 
economy. Not to mention that still “the largest federal expenditure on Guam is for military 
operations” (Bureau of Statistics and Plans, 2003: 11). 
 
3.1. Military Buildup as an Economic Growth Engine  
 
The military is a major infrastructure for the Guamanian economy because Guam cannot 
survive without support from the U.S. military bases. Guam has no natural resources. One of 
the direct sources that explain the influence of U.S. military bases on the Guamanian 
economy is the military contracts awarded for base buildup.  
Figure 1 shows the military contracts delivered to Guam since 2001. The military 
contracts were not high prior to the buildup. However, since the buildup announcement by 
the United States, military contracts delivered to private companies increased. In 2001, the 
amount of federal dollars awarded for the buildup of the military bases amounted to 48 
million dollars. The number increased to 203 million dollars in year 2002 and kept rising 
until 2008. Although there was a slight decrease in 2004, the amount has escalated compared 
to 2001.  
 
 
Figure 1. Guam Military Contracts Awarded 
*Source: USAspending.gov Website, http://www.usaspending.gov, recited from Ruane, Maria Claret 
M., “Economic Forecast- Guam Edition 2010” (First Bank of Hawaii, 2010).  














According to the Economic Forecast reported by the Bank of Hawaii, the military 
increase of Guam due to the continual rise of military contracts from the DoD has also meant 
a boost in the economy as well (Ruane, 2010). The military contracts signified not only the 
rise of companies but the growth of the island’s population. With this buildup, the 
Guamanian population is expected to increase by 30 percent until 2012. This is “almost 
550,000 people within a 6-year period” (Camacho, 2008:10). With the help from military 
contracts, the increase in population along with businesses has directly influenced the growth 
of the Guamanian economy. Moreover, the U.S. military bases not only benefits Guamanian 
economy by bringing cash flow into the island, but also intervenes the formation of the 
market structure.  
 
3.2. Economic Structure Change among Industries in Guam     
 
As there are positive growth opportunities for the host territories from U.S. military 
spending, there are also negative impacts on the hosting grounds (Fallows, 2002; Hooker, 
2001; Soden, Shauer and Conary, 2005). Those with negative views argue that military bases 
limit the diversity of the local economy. On this note, this paper provides the limitation of 
the industrial diversity in Guam. In turn, the U.S. military bases penetrate U.S. power into 
the host territories by influencing the economic structure.  
Although efforts have been made by the Guamanian government and the Guam 
Economic Development and Commerce Authority to facilitate non-military related sectors, 
the link between military and economy is unavoidable due to the limited resources and its 
geological limitations. This study identifies the effects of the military bases on the economy 
with hourly wages in industrial sectors. 
The average hourly wage can be used as a tool to measure the relationship between the 
economy and the military. Referring to the hourly wages of industries allows us focus solely 
on the industry. Below in Tables 4-1 and 4-2, the average hourly earnings of private sector 
workers from 1999 to 2008 are provided5. When observing the total wage change during the 
10 years span, there has been an increase of approximately 2 dollars. However, different 
observation can be seen by examining diverse economic sphere.  
 
Table 4-1. Average Hourly Earnings of Private Sector Workers  
(Unit: Dollars) 
Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total $9.90 $10.18 $10.81 $10.67 $10.92 
Agriculture 8.36 8.42 8.76 9.46 9.84 
Construction 8.36 8.42 8.76 12.46 12.23 
Manufacturing 12.29 13.97 11.61 13.14 12.19 
Transportation 13.87 14.87 13.90 14.27 14.90 
Wholesale trade 12.27 13.68 12.02 11.53 9.28 
Retail trade 8.45 8.23 8.86 9.13 10.04 
Finance, Insurance  
and Real Estate 
12.50 10.64 10.20 10.39 10.93 
Services 8.02 8.61 10.30 9.47 9.43 
*Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Guam Department of Labor, Government of Guam  
**Note: Figures are averages of four quarters of the calendar year.  
                                                          
5 Division of business sectors have been divided by the Guam Department of Labor. 
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Table 4-2. Average Hourly Earnings of Private Sector Workers  
(Unit: Dollars) 
Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total 11.03 10.85 10.84 11.29 11.47 
Agriculture 9.01 7.74 7.95 8.32 8.72 
Construction  13.06 12.90 13.48 12.66 13.41 
Manufacturing  12.47 12.34 14.54 14.42 13.07 
Transportation 14.63 15.35 13.49 14.80 14.71 
Wholesale trade  8.82 9.28 8.98 9.35 10.37 
Retail trade 9.97 9.95 10.33 9.96 9.89 
Finance, Insurance  
and Real Estate  
10.98 10.93 12.03 12.19 12.44 
Services  9.87 8.93 9.01 9.85 10.21 
*Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Guam Department of Labor, Government of Guam  
**Note: Figures are averages of four quarters of the calendar year.  
 
Table 5. The Amount of Variation of Average Hourly Earnings of Private Sector Workers between 
1999 and 2008 
Sector AV 
Total $1.57  
Agriculture 0.36 
Construction  5.05 
Manufacturing  0.78 
Transportation 0.84 
Wholesale trade  -1.90 
Retail trade 1.44 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate  - 0.06 
Services  2.19  
*Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Guam Department of Labor, Government of Guam  
** Note: Data calculation done by the author  
***Note: Figures are averages of four quarters of the calendar year.  
****AV: Amount of Variation  
 
There has been change in wages in every business sector over the years; however, not all 
changes have been made in the same direction. Table 5 shows the calculation of variation in 
average hourly earnings between 1999 and 2008. A comparison is possible because the 
amount of variation considers all sectors from the equal baseline of the year 1999.  
In Table 5, construction (+$5.05), services (+$2.19), transportation (+$0.84), manufacturing 
(+$0.78), and retail trade (+$1.44) has positively shifted in the average annual earnings. 
Among the 5 positively affected areas, construction (+$5.05) has achieved the most gain. 
This shows that military buildup entails major construction projects. However, there are 
industries negatively affected by the military expansion. Wholesale trade wages have 
decreased by 1.90 dollars, while insurance and real estate by 0.06 dollars. Although 
agriculture has had a positive shift of 0.36 dollars, the fact that the average hourly wage 
between construction and agriculture was the same in 1999 shows that agriculture has been 
in a position of relative disadvantages.  




Such change of economic structure can be interpreted as an impact of the U.S. military 
base buildup. With other variables controlled, the makeup of industries has shifted according 
to the direction of U.S. military bases. This economic structure tends to make the host 
territory lean towards the military bases with or without legal obligations, forming an 
‘invisible structure’ to convey U.S. influence.  
 
3.3. Increase of Foreign Companies  
 
Another influence of U.S. military bases is the increase of foreign companies in the island. 
Due to the inflow of foreign firms, the importance of foreign and multinational firms has 
increased. Therefore, the politics of military bases of the DoD affects the nationality 
structure of the host territory.  
As the fall of the iron curtains announced a shift in the structure of world power, there 
was no longer a need for the United States to continue its military buildup. With the increase 
of both the public and governmental opinions toward the decrease of U.S. forces, the DoD 
had to cut down its budget for military investment (Grasso, 2005). With such background, 
the OMB Circular A-76 Policy was announced for effective DoD business performance. 
The OMB Circular A-76 Policy allows foreign companies and their employees to enter 
the host territory. Although military-related jobs are created by competition among 
companies, the cost-effective foreign companies have more chance to take advantage. For 
such reasons, local firms have less opportunity in DoD projects. As noted in the 146th 
Congressional Record H925, Congress member Robert Underwood appealed to the Congress 
about the hardships faced by local companies.  
 
“The Navy justified using a Base Operating System contract, taking such diverse things as 
providing day care to loading ordinance to house maintenance, and bundling them all in one 
contract because they said that this was the way that they would get an economy of scale. Another 
cost saving measure that was being considered by the Navy at the time was to use foreign or H–2 
workers which were allowed into Guam and therefore it would significantly depress the costs of the 
contractor, thereby competing more unfairly with the existing civil service.., …… The contractor 
comes in and says I can do it for less, does not have the labor pool to identify, and will end up 
bringing in a lot of people from off island, from off of Guam, resulting in some level of 
displacement of the population” (Underwood, 2000). 
 
In Figure 2, federal contracts granted from the DoD to companies in Guam are 
categorized according to their national origin. Since the military bases build up in Guam, the 
number of military contracts given to foreign companies has increased. Meanwhile, 
opportunities given to local firms have decreased.  
The increase of foreign companies has, in turn, produced an increased inflow of foreigners 
into the island. It is evident in Table 6 that the increase of U.S. military bases has not only 
brought soldiers but also business-related foreigners into the island. After the 1990s when 
U.S. military bases began to increase in size, a huge inflow of off-islanders came into Guam. 
While 690 respondents have entered the island for military reasons, 882 have come for 
business-related reasons. As military bases grow in size, more foreign companies and 
businesses are needed, diversifying the inflow of ethnicities and nationalities. The following 
part of this paper deduces the formation of Guamanian identity. 
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Figure 2. Department of Defense Construction Contracts in Guam (Fiscal Year 1995-2010) 




Table 6. Cross table for Guam Entrance Reason by Year of Entrance 
Reason for Guam Entrance 
 Employment Military Follow 
spouse or parent
Other Total 
1990’s 882 690 2070 842 4484 
1980’s 22 2 15 7 46 
1970’s 45 5 35 12 97 
1960’s 75 15 190 47 327 
1950’s 210 24 463 150 847 
Entrance 
Year 
before 1950 291 41 855 277 1464 
Total 1525 777 3628 1335 7265 
*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “2000 Public Use Microdata Sample” 
 
 
4. IMPACT OF U.S. MILITARY BASES ON THE GUAMANIAN IDENTITY 
 
An important form of power penetration besides economic intervention is the influence 
on the “inner” part of a society; the “inner” meaning social identity of the people. The 
identity of Guamanians is greatly linked to the military bases. This can be found through “the 
remoteness, economic dependency, and political autonomy” (Baldcchino, 2008: 138) of the 
host territories of U.S. military bases.  
This section of the paper explores the impact of the bases on the local identity of the 
Guamanians. The local residents promote a unique local identity called the Guamanian 
identity. Such Guamanian identity is a ‘trans-ethnical’ identity that includes the diverse racial 
backgrounds of the Guamanian residents. By explaining the origin of the Guamanian identity 




from the native Chamorro race and the “neo-Chamorro,” this study describes the promotion 
of the Guamanian identity. Moreover, a generation gap regarding the identity indication is 
shown as a result of the increase in military bases. 
Guam is a culturally and nationally complex area. Before coming into contact with the 
West, Guam was populated by the indigenous Chamorro people. Although the Chamorro 
culture still exists on the island, their former stance as the owners of Guam has greatly 
deteriorated. Especially during the Spanish reign, the pure blooded Chamorros were 
drastically reduced in size. According to the Spanish census conducted in 1710, there were 
3,539 natives. By 1742, only 1,576 pure Chamorros remained (Underwood, 1976). 
The term “Guamanian” appeared in the early years following World War II. This new 
name for the residents of Guam had first been given by the U.S. Naval administration. With 
the U.S. governing the island, the people of Guam has “transformed in the wake of the war’s 
social, political, and cultural upheaval. Significant among these changes was the replacing of 
Chamorro with Guamanian” (Guampedia). 
 
4.1. Trans-Ethnical Characteristic of the Guamanian Identity 
 
Guamanian identity consists of a ‘colorful’ ethnic and cultural background. According to 
the 2000 census, of the total population of 154,805, the Chamorro represents 37.1%, Asians 
and other Pacific islanders 56%, and Caucasians 6.9%. While less than half of the population 
is indigenous, the diversity existing on the island can be seen through these numbers. Even 
though the population consists of diverse people, most of them are U.S. citizens while also 
being Guamanians.  
81.9% of the total population6 is U.S. citizens but the islanders view themselves as 
Guamanians. As mentioned above, there exists a shared identity among the local residents 
regardless of their original racial background. The 2000 U.S. Census public sample data on 
Guam provides different identity indications among the diverse races in Guam. Based on the 
shared historical and political experience among the people, the Guamanian identity can be 
viewed as a result of shared experience among the diverse races and ethnicities in Guam.  
Table 1 in the footnote provides the frequency of respondents recognizing themselves 
with ‘the Pacific Islander Identity’7 from the 2000 U.S. Census data. Based on the identities  
                                                          
6 Data based on the U.S. 2000 Census on Guam.  
7 In the dataset, the term Guamanian Identity Indication is not used. The answers for “What is this 
person’s ethnic origin or race?,” is viewed to not being able to categorize the diverse identity in Guam. 
The answers for Guamanian (code: 821), Guam (code: 821), GU (code: 821), Chamorro (code: 822) 
and Chamorro Islander (code: 821) were all coded under the name Chamorro. Such coding does not 
consider the difference between the term Guamanian and the Chamorro. Moreover, another limitation 
which this indicator has within it is that the Chamorro, Palauan, Marshallese, Kosraean, Pohnpeian, 
Chuukese, Yapese, Carloinian and Other Pacific Islanders were all grouped into the category of 
“Pacific Islanders.” Therefore, to abstract only the respondent who answered as “Chamorro” or 
“Guamanian” for their origin, the respondents whom have indicated their birthplace as Hawaii, 
Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, Samoa, Micronesia and Palau were deleted from the dataset. 
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Table 7. Guamanian Identity  
*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “2000 Public Use Microdata Sample8” 
**Note: Question: What is this person’s ethnic origin or race? The answers for Guamanian (code: 821), 
Guam (code: 821), GU (code: 821), Chamorro (code: 822) and Chamorro Islander (code: 821) were all 
coded under the name Chamorro. To abstract only the respondent who answered as “Chamorro” or 
“Guamanian” for their origin, the respondents whom have indicated their birthplace as Hawaii, 
Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, Samoa, Micronesia and Palau were deleted from the dataset. 
Therefore, the Pacific Islander identification in this paper can be viewed as the Guamanian 
identification.  
***Note: The coding for the “Indicate the Guamanian Identity?” are Yes (1) and No (0).  
 
that the respondents have chosen, the ‘Guamanian Identity’ variable was formed. The survey 
question used in this identity indication is an open-ended question, asking “What is this 
person’s ethnical or racial origin?” The respondents were free to answer in one or two 
ethnical or racial categories.9 In Table 7, the Guamanian identity indication regardless of 
ethnical background is depicted.  
Among the respondents of the “Guamanian” category,10 140 of them referred themselves 
to the “Guamanian” identity, while 6,139 referred themselves to other racial identifications. 
Such identification of the Guamanian identity is revealed in Perez’s work through interviews.  
In “Colonialism, Americanization, and Indigenous Identity: A Research Note on 
Chamorro Identity in Guam,” Michael Perez conducts an empirical investigation based on 
semi-structured ethnographic interviews of native Chamorros in Guam. In his study, Perez 
focuses on the identity indications of the Chamorros. Other than focusing on the Chamorro 
identity, Perez’s study looks into the interviewed data related to Guamanian identity. In the 
interview results, the interviewees’ voices on ‘identity formation’ can be found. One of the 
respondents named Lisa has made an interesting response. This type of reformation can be 
seen as a Guamanian identity indication.  
                                                          
Table 1. The Pacific Islander Identity Indication 
 Frequency Valid Percentage 
Yes  8,311  53.9 
No  7,121  46.1 
Total  15,432  100.0 
 
8 Ethnicity categorized as “others” has been deleted from the dataset for simplification.  
9 Due to the Federal Register Notice entitled “Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of 
Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity” issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1997, 
five minimum race categories (White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, 
Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander) have changed in the Census report since 1980. 
In addition to the five race groups, respondents were offered the option of selecting one or more races.  
10 Therefore, to show the level of Guamanian identity indication, the coding was done in an ordinal 
order: Yes (1) and No (0). 
Indicate the Guamanian Identity?  Frequency Valid Percentage 
Yes       6,139   97.8 
No          140     2.2 
Total        6,279 100.0 




“Ok, well I consider myself a Chamorro before anything else … And then Guamanian … Some 
people, … they don’t understand what Chamorro is. They say, “I’m not really a Chamorro, because 
they died a long time ago.” And I tell them, “If you want to get technical about it,” … and “that I 
have Chamorro ancestry.” Because Guamanian is more like how people interpret it. Like the 
Haoles (white Americans) interpret it as they’re Guamanian if they’ve lived here (Guam) a long 
time” (Perez, 2005:858). 
 
Lisa seems to interpret herself as part of both the Guamanian and Chamorro identity. She 
considers the Guamanian identity as her identity to emphasize her ethnic identity. The 
following is another interview with a man named John.   
 
“I consider myself … a Chamorro from Guam … Guamanian … describes your place of origin 
by geographic location …. Because once you move to Guam, you could be a Guamanian just as if 
you moved to California, you would be a “Californian” …. I guess a lot of people …. Use the term 
“Guamanian: a lot … because they just want to make sure people know where they’re from … And 
then “American.” … I just don’t see myself as American … It’s a label … I do not use Asian 
American because I do not consider myself an Asian” (Perez, 2005:858). 
 
John, who is ethnically an Asian American, does not relate himself to his ethnic 
background but rather to how he identifies himself towards the island. The variable of 
Guamanian identity in Table 7 and the interview conducted by Michael Perez show the 
notion of the Guamanian identity, which is shared among diverse ethnicities in Guam.  
 
4.2. The Generation Gap in Guamanian Identity Indication 
 
The military base in Guam also influences the generational gap among the Guamanian 
residents. Setting the Guamanian populace as the main focus group, there is a difference in 
indication towards the military depending on one’s generation cohort.  
According to Robert Inglehart, there are limitations in explaining the whole “identity 
confusion issue” with one single aspect of a society. To explain the people’s indication, an 
economic and political shift must be viewed to explain the previous value system of the 
people (Inglehart, 1990). Since the economic and political effects are interlinked in such 
logic, an increase in the U.S. military force should be considered as one of the most 
important variables that affects the value system of the Guamanians.  
Furthermore, “culture is a system of attitudes, values and knowledge that is widely shared 
within a society and transmitted from generation to generation.” For this reason, a shift 
within an identity implicates a “deeply disturbing” one. This can be seen in Inglehart’s 
Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society: “basic cultural norms are difficult to change 
[but] when they do change, the experience is likely to be disorienting and deeply disturbing 
to those raised under the previous value system” (Inglehart, 1990:13). 
A change in the value system is closely linked with the cultural change in a society, 
especially in how people inside the society view the change. Regarding the military bases in 
Guam, there seems to be a generation gap in the public’s perception of the bases. In other 
words, the local residents have divergent opinions on the increase of the military bases. The 
overall opinion is that the bases are “good for the economy, [and] bad for the culture” (Owen, 
2010). 
A survey of 403 participants directed by Amy Owen, a scholar at the University of Guam, 
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shows that 53% of the Guamanian residents view the military buildup to be generally 
positive for the island. However, the perception towards the military base differs according 
to the age range of the participants. While the eldest group is concerned about the native 
culture, the youth in Guam is worried about the Guamanian culture. Thus, the survey results 
show that the ethnic origin of the Guamanian people is not an influential element on the 
different views of the military (Owen, 2010:314-15). 
The Guamanian youth views the military-base buildup to negatively affect the island’s 
culture. Regarding the perception difference between generations in Guam, the present study 
connects such indication difference with the concept of the Guamanian identity. By 
connecting this perspective difference with the Guamanian identity, it can be concluded that 
military bases have a significant impact on the generational gap among the Guamanians.    
Table 9 shows the generational gap in terms of identity recognition among Guamanians. 
Among the respondents who consider themselves Guamanians, 82 are in their teens and 20s. 
 
 
Table 8. Perception towards the Military Buildup in Guam 
* Recited from Owen, Amy. 2010. “Guam Culture, Immigration, and the U.S. Military Build-up.” Asia 
Pacific Viewpoint 51(3):313. 
 
 
Table 9. Generation Gap in terms of Identity Recognition among Guamanians 
Age Group  Indicate the Guamanians 
Identity? 10~20 30~40 above 50 Total 
97.0% 98.3% 98.5% 97.8% No 
(2,654) (2,108) (1,377) (6,139) 
3.0% 1.7% 1.5% 2.2% Yes 
(82) (37) (21) (140) 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 (2,736) (2,145) (1,398) (6,279) 
χ2 = 13.292, df=2, p=.001  
*Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “2000 Public Use Microdata Sample11” 
**Note: Question: What is this person’s ethnic origin or race? The answers for Guamanian (code: 821), 
Guam (code: 821), GU (code: 821), Chamorro (code: 822) and Chamorro Islander (code: 821) were all 
coded under the name Chamorro. To abstract only the respondent who answered as “Chamorro” or 
“Guamanian” for their origin, the respondents whom have indicated their birthplace as Hawaii, 
Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands, Samoa, Micronesia and Palau were deleted from the dataset. 
Therefore, the Pacific Islander identification in this paper can be viewed as the Guamanian 
identification.  
***Note: The coding for the “Indicate the Guamanian Identity?” are Yes (1) and No (0).  
                                                          
11 Ethnicity categorized as “others” has been deleted from the dataset for simplification.  
Perception questions  Response 
Participant characteristics 
(p-value) 
Build-up is overall positive Yes (53%) No (41%) Age (0.04) 
Build-up is good for Guam’s culture Yes (21%) No (74%) Age (0.00) 




Regardless of their original ethnical background, the younger generations (10s~20s) relate 
themselves more with the Guamanian identity than those in the middle age range (30s~40s) 
and the elder generation (above 50s). This can be understood as an influence of the 
perception gap on the military bases. Findings show that the youth tend to related themselves 
with Guamanian identity and at the same time negatively view the bases. Therefore, the 
difference in opinion towards the military bases demonstrates a generational gap in terms of 
identity recognition among Guamanian residents.   
The inflow of military bases has produced an economic structural change in that the 
recognition towards military bases has changed over generations. Along with this attitude 
change, the categorization of the Guamanians has changed as well. Thus, the perception on 
the military bases differs among generations, which indicates a generation gap.  
U.S. military bases denote a dominant power in Guam, which leads to a shared logic that 
the bases affect the minds of the Guamanian residents. The generational gap regarding the 
recognition of military bases, as well as a Guamanian identity indication, shows that military 





“U.S. bases are … institutions and embodiments of U.S. power, identity and diplomacy” 
(Cooley, 2008: 7). As shown throughout this study, U.S. military bases can be viewed as a 
symbol of U.S. power conveyance. The United States’ overseas military bases in Guam have 
been studied as a tool in delivering U.S. power into the economy and culture of host 
territories. As seen through this study, an overseas basin is not only an instrument of military 
power but also a medium that influences the economy and culture of a territory.   
Based on this logical foundation, military bases in Guam have been explained as a 
method of United States’ power being implemented into the economic sphere and the 
island’s identity. It is true that military bases in Guam have limitations in representing all 
overseas bases. Since Guam has a limited self-governing structure under the influence of the 
United States, such particular situation cannot be applied to other U.S. overseas bases in 
other countries. For this reason, the variable of the political uniqueness of Guam was 
controlled. However, the influence of U.S. military bases in other sovereignties has more 
political impact as compared to Guam. Therefore, the Guam case can be viewed as a narrow 
prism in viewing the overall picture of overseas bases.  
The present study also contains limitations for using data sets from the U.S. Census and 
other indirect surveys rather than conducting direct surveys to measure the influence of U.S. 
military bases on the economy and identity. However, by using the datasets presented in the 
study, the indirect borderline between the military base, the economy, and the Guamanian 
identity is made clearer. Such usage of data has proven to be useful in presenting indirect 
linkage for future studies. With such meaning, this paper has indicated that military bases 
affect the economic growth, economic structure, and the generation gap towards identity 
indication in hosting lands. Considering this influence as a consequence to U.S. military 
bases, the overseas basins can be revaluated for projecting such influence.  
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